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Abstract
This paper reviews evidence on the changing structure of the US innovation ecosystem
and then develops a simple model of the rise and fall of the large corporate lab. We
suggest that the growth of American universities allowed at rst the formation of large
corporate labs by training scientists to work in industrial labs. Subsequently, however,
start-up invention spurred by university research provided an increasingly attractive
alternative to internal research, leading to the demise of the large corporate lab. We
use this model to assess whether the substitution of corporate research with start-up
invention can result in insu¢ cient variety in the innovation ecosystem. We nd that,
when levels of university research and start-up activity are high, large rms can have
socially excessive incentives to focus on open innovation. Thus, despite its potential
e¢ ciency benets, a division of innovative labor may encourage me too innovations
and reduce diversity in the innovation ecosystem.
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Science is, surely, a very practical activity but, typically, only in the long-run (Rosenberg,
1991: 337).
1 Introduction
This paper brings together three themes that featured prominently in Nathan Rosenbergs
research: (i) The economic importance of science (e.g., Rosenberg, 1974, 1990; Rosenberg
and Nelson, 1994) (ii) the idea that technological advance proceeds through the interactions
of many actors in an innovation system (e.g., Mowery and Rosenberg, 1993, 1998; Nelson
and Rosenberg 1996), and (iii) that diversity and experimentation are very important to
the process of technical change and economic growth (e.g., Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986;
Rosenberg, 1992).
In a paper provocatively titled Why do rms do basic research (with their own money)?
Rosenberg (1990) focused on the apparently anomalous phenomenon of corporate research.
Somewhat ironically, corporate research had already in decline from its zenith in the 1980s
(e.g., Coombs and Georghiou, 2002; Mowery, 2009, Arora, Belenzon and Patacconi, 2018).
University spin-o¤s and other start-ups, often funded by venture capital, were emerging as
important innovators (e.g., Drake, 2014). The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 has also encouraged uni-
versities to patent and licence their technologies, contributing to entrepreneurial dynamism
in the US. Mowery (2009: 1) argues, and we agree, that in many ways these developments
have not create an entirely new system, but rather revived important elements of the in-
dustrial research systemof the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
where large corporations mainly relied on small inventors and technology markets to provide
growth opportunities.
In this paper, we follow Mowery and review the evidence on the changing structure of the
US innovation ecosystem, including recent evidence that has since become available. We then
propose a simple model that highlights linkages between university and industry research,
and can capture the rise and fall of the large corporate lab. Large rms invent either through
research carried out inside their labs or by partnering with start-ups (open innovation).
Invention by start-ups is spurred by university research.1 We suggest that universities initially
contributed to the growth of large corporate labs by training scientists that corporations could
1The model could equivalently be interpreted as one where large rms acquire start-ups and then rene
and commercialize their inventions.
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hire. Over time, however, university research reduced the incentives to invest in corporate
labs by providing an increasingly attractive alternative: start-up invention. Note that in our
model technology markets provide most of large rmsinventions both early on and in later
periods. The reason, however, is di¤erent. Early on technology markets are thin but setting
up a large corporate lab is prohibitively costly due to lack of human capital. Later on hiring
scientists becomes relatively cheap but technology markets become even more attractive.
We use this model to address a fundamental issue in the innovation literature: whether
markets, left to themselves, are likely to spawn a socially desirable degree of rm [and in-
novation] heterogeneity(Holbrook, Cohen, Hounshell and Klepper, 2000: 1017). There are
two types of heterogeneity in our model. First, large rms and start-ups may focus on dif-
ferent types of problems. For instance, large rms may work on improving the architectural
aspects of a product, while start-ups may focus on improving specic components. We call
this heterogeneity in types of inventions. Second, even though multiple start-ups can work on
improving a single component (so that their inventions are substitutes), they may do so by
pursuing di¤erent approaches. This heterogeneity in approaches also benets society because
it ensures that, even if one start-up fails, another may succeed.
We nd that in some cases large rms over-invest in internal research and engage too
little in open innovation (compared to what a social planner would do), and in other cases
large rms under-invest in internal research and engage too much in open innovation.
Large rms tend to engage too little in open innovation because the rents from successful
collaboration are shared with partners. As such, large rms tend to value collaboration too
little compared to the social planner and tend to over-invest in internal research. Counter-
balancing this e¤ect, however, there are appropriability considerations, which may give large
rms excessive incentives to engage in open innovation. These excessive incentives stems
from the fact that a large rm still gains something from commercializing a start-up inven-
tion, even when other similar inventions are plentiful. There is a wedge between private and
social returns from innovation, because rms care about winning market share (so that sub-
stitute, me tooinventions can be protable as well), whereas society only cares that one of
these inventions is brought to market. Because of this e¤ect, open innovation can become an
excessively attractive alternative to internal research, and large rms may under-invest in in-
ternal research. In this case, we have too little heterogeneity in types of inventions (too little
internal innovation and too many similar start-up innovations), although the heterogeneity
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in approaches associated with start-up invention can in principle also benet society.
The model suggests that over the last quarter of a century, the US economy may have
transitioned from a situation where investments in internal research were excessive to a sit-
uation where internal research is now underfunded (from societys viewpoint). The growth
of American universities has created a vibrant start-up ecosystem, but the risk of underin-
vestment in internal research is most salient precisely when start-up invention is plentiful.
In that case, the open innovation strategy of large rms can result in innovations that the
market would have generated anyway. Society would benet if large rms invested more of
their resources in internal research.
To maintain focus, our model neglects the considerable challenge of managing research
in large, for-prot rms. These challenges include not only the potential agency conicts
between managers and investors, though these are considerable, but also the conicts between
the need to allow researchers to pursue speculative long-term projects and the incentives and
culture of focusing on directly commercially relevant activities. Hounshell and Smith (1988),
Kay (1988), and Hoskisson, Hitt and Hill (1993) provide useful discussions of these and other
issues in the management of research.
2 Evolution of the US innovation ecosystem: A histor-
ical perspective
Over the last 150 years, the United States rose from a relatively backward position in science
and technology to a position of undisputed pre-eminence. In this section we summarize the
development of the US scientic-industrial complex, which has been extensively described
by, inter alia, Nelson and Rosenberg (1994, 1996), Hounshell (1996) and Mowery (2009). We
supplement their accounts with more recent data, including evidence reported in Arora et al.
(2018).
Our discussion focuses primarily on research, rather than development, and highlights
the changing roles of three key actors in the US innovation ecosystem: universities and
other public research institutions, such as the Federal labs and the National Institute of
Health (henceforth, universities for short), large corporations and their corporate labs
(henceforth, large rms), and (iii) individual inventors, small rms and science-based start-
ups (henceforth, small rmsor start-ups). We largely neglect the very important role
of federal government in identifying strategic technology areas and promoting research and
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innovation in those areas. See, e.g., Mowery (2010), Mazzuccato (2013) and Klepper (2016,
chapter 5) for more on this.
We higlight two key trends: the rapid growth of the American system of higher education,
and the rise and fall of the large corporate lab. The rise of the large corporate lab also coin-
cided with a decline in the importance of technology markets, while its fall was accompanied
by a resurgence of these markets and by an increasing role of small rms in the US innovation
ecosystem.
Following Mowery (2009), we divide our discussion into three periods: 1870-1940, 1940-
1980, and 1980-to date.2
2.1 1870-1940: Early development of the US scientic-innovation
complex
American universities had, from the early days of the republic to the end of World War
II, a widespread reputation for being oriented toward practice and vocation (Rosenberg
and Nelson, 1996: 88). Colleges catered to the needs of the their communities by teaching
subjects such as agriculture and home economics, while research and training also tended to
reect the demands of local industries. By the 1920s, the University of Akron, for instance,
trained personnel for the local rubber industry and became well known for its research in
the processing of rubber. The universities of Kentucky and North Carolina did extensive
work on developing technologies for the tobacco industry (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1996).
Scientists at the University of Oklahoma pioneered the use of reection seismology for oil
and gas exploration in the 1920s and to this day the University of Oklahoma boasts one of
the leading petroleum engineering programs in the US. But despite these and other examples
of excellence, it is fair to say that American universities lagged well behind their leading
European counterparts in terms of research quality. Perhaps the most revealing indicator in
this respect was the fact, noted by many observers, that most of Americas leading scientists
got their training in Europe.
To some extent, the close intertwining between universities and local communities was
a consequence of limited federal funding, which increased universitiesreliance on state and
2As in most long-term historical processes, identifying specic start and end dates for given periods is
di¢ cult. Mowery (2009), for instance, takes 1985 as the start date of the third period in the development
of industrial R&D in the US. We chose 1980 because (i) it is simpler to divide the whole period of analysis
(1870-to date) in decades, and (ii) the Bayh-Dole Act and other important institutional developments took
place in the early 1980s.
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industry funding. The connection was so strong that, according to some observers, a large
share of American university research was essentially industrial problem solving, at least
until the 1920s (Bruce 1987; Geiger, 2004). University-industry linkages were evident in
the pharmaceutical sector, where companies such as Squibb, Eli Lilly, Merck and Upjohn
supported many university research programs (Swann, 1988). In industries such as railroads,
oil rening, and electrical lighting, rms relied upon independent inventors, but also tried
to engage university scientists as consultants. After World War I, federal support for basic
research grew but the commitment was less than complete, as exemplied by Hale, Millikan,
and othersfailed attempt to create a German-style, national scientic laboratory devoted to
basic research (Hounshell, 1996).
Corporate investments in in-house laboratories were also initially quite modest. The
leading American rms of the 1870s and 1880s, such as the railroad companies and Western
Union, mostly relied on external inventions. However, during the 1870s, the leading railroad
companies began employing college trained engineers to perform tests and gather data more
systematically. Over time,they established industrial labs to evaluate the quality of these ex-
ternal inventions and other inputs (Usselman, 1991; Mowery, 1995; Hounshell, 1996; Carlson,
2013). For instance, the Pennsylvania Railroads chemical laboratory in Altoona, established
in 1876, focused on the standardization and testing of supplies such as steel rails and lubri-
cating oils. Innovation, when it occurred, was incremental in nature. While Pennsylvania
Railroad was quick in the adoption of many important innovations, these mostly came from
independent inventors such as George Westinghouse (Usselman, 1984).
This division of innovative labor between large corporations, which focused on improve-
ments and commercialization, and small rms and individual inventors, which focused on
invention, was supported by an active market for technology, especially in the 1880-1920
period (Lamoreaux and Sokolo¤, 1999). These markets for technology, however, did not
remain vibrant for long. During the inter-war years, corporations grew larger and more anx-
ious to control and routinizeinnovation. Their propensity to rely on external innovations
decreased. Reasons are varied but include growing product-market competition, which made
research a more important source of competitive advantage, anti-trust pressures, which re-
duced alternative sources of growth besides internal research, and the rising costs of invention,
which made it di¢ cult for inventors to continue to operate independently (Lamoreaux and
Sokolo¤, 1999; Hounshell, 1996). As a result, corporate investments in internal research grew
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rapidly. For instance, using National Research Council survey data, Mowery and Rosenberg
(1998) show that employment of scientists and engineers in US manufacturing industries,
steadily rose from less than 3,000 in 1921 to nearly 46,000 in 1946.
2.2 1940-1980: The age of Big Science.
The victory in World War II was a watershed moment for American science. The victory was
attributed at least in part to the ability of the US government to mobilize the US scientic
community and channel a massive research e¤ort to military and industrial purposes. The
atomic bomb was without doubt the most prominent example of the power of science (for
better or for worse), but developments such as the radar and the mass production of penicillin
also played an important role. The result was a very signicant improvement in the status
of science and scientists among policymakers, managers, and the general public. The e¤ect
on the scale and organization of scientic activity were far-reaching.
Most notably, federal support for research and development in universities expanded very
rapidly. Table 1, which updates Table 2 in Rosenberg and Nelson (1994) using more recent
NSF data, shows that Federal support for academic R&D grew more than sixfold in real
terms during the decade 1955-1965. The same gure more than doubled from 1965 to 1975,
and then again from 1975 to 1985. In the 1960s and 1970s, Federal support for academic
R&D as a percentage of total reached its peak.
A second signicant change was the shift in the composition of academic R&D towards
the basic research end of the spectrum. While linkages between universities and industry
remained strong in the US, the notion that universitiesprimary mission is to advance the
frontiers of knowledge gained momentum. Table 2, which uses NSF data to update Table 4 in
Rosenberg and Nelson (1994), shows that the percentage of basic research in total academic
R&D grew from 52% in 1955, to 69% in 1960 and 76.5% in 1965. By mid 1960s, American
universities enjoyed a world leading status in most elds of science. Perhaps the best indicator
of this was the reversal of a previously noted pattern: students now ew from Europe to the
US to do their graduate training (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994).
Tables 1 and 2 (Tables 2 and 4 in Rosenberg and Nelson 1994, updated)
The growing practical applicability of recently discovered scientic principles, landmark
inventions (e.g., vacuum tubes, radio, synthetic rubber, nylon), and the rapid increase in
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government funding in the United States also led to more companies investing in internal
research after World War II. The earlier commercial successes of scientic discoveries by
companies such as Du Pont and General Electric lent credibility to the idea that investments
in research could be a source of competitive advantage. Evidence from the largest 200 US
manufacturing rms indicates that, during the period preceding World War II (1921-1946),
investments in R&D tended to reinforce the position of dominant rms (Mowery, 1983).
Corporations such as AT&T, Merck, IBM and Xerox subscribed to the view that research
was the key to growth. They employed thousands of scientists whose chief objective was to
conduct research. At its peak in the late 1960s, AT&Ts Bell Labs employed 15,000 people,
about 1,200 of which had PhDs (Gertner, 2013). To date, its alumni include 14 Nobel Prize
winners and 5 recipients of the Turing Award. Innovations attributable to Bell Labs include
the transistor, ber optics, lasers, cellular telephony, the C programming language, and the
Unix operating system.
2.3 1980-to date: Open innovation and the demise of the large
corporate lab.
The 1980s were characterized by important institutional developments. The BayhDole Act
of 1980, which permits academic institutions to own patents resulting from publicly funded
science, encouraged American universities to become more engaged in the commercialization
of their research. Various patent and administrative reforms, such as the creation in 1982
of a pro-patent Court of Appeals in the US, strengthened intellectual property rights,
arguably promoting entrepreneurial activity and technology markets. The widely successful
IPOs of venture-backed Genentech in 1980, 3Com in 1984, Sun Microsystems and Oracle in
1986, contributed to the growth of the venture capital industry in the US (Kenney, 2011),
providing science-based start-ups with a new and potential valuable source of capital.
At about the same time, perceptions of the protability of corporate research began
to change. Success stories such as Du Ponts started to fade from memory. Xerox was
taken as a more paradigmatic example, for its inability to prot from the many inventions
that its Xeroxs PARC Lab had generated. Books such as Fumbling the Future: How
Xerox Invented, then Ignored, the First Personal Computerby Smith and Alexander (1988)
reinforced the view large rms were often bureaucratic and myopic, and their research would
therefore mostly end up beneting other rms, such as nimble and hungry start-ups.
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Corporate spending on research in the US began to decline as a share of total R&D
expenditure. Figure 1 shows that the share of basic and applied research in corporate R&D
in the US dropped from 28% in 1985 to less than 20% in 2015.
Figure 1. Less R, More D, Inputs
Focusing on public companies and using data on corporate publications in scientic jour-
nals as a measure of corporate research, Arora et al. (2018) also nd a marked drop in
corporate research in a wide range of industries (see Figures 2a and 2b). Further, they nd
that the drop reects both a decline of research by established rms as well as the entry of
many rms that perform little research, and that this decline is associated with a reduction
of the private value of research.
Figure 2a and 2b. Less R, More D, Publications
Given that science remains useful to invention, the decline in corporate publications may
reect an increasing reliance on external knowledge by large corporations. Corporations
may withdraw from research because a lot of useful research is already being produced by
external institutions. Arora, Belenzon and Sheer (2017) show that the decline in corporate
publications is related to a reduction in the use of internal research and an increase in the use
of external science, as measured by citations to scientic publications by corporate patents.
Figure 3 shows that patents by corporations cite less of their own published work, and more
papers published by external institutions. External research and invention may in part be
nanced by large rms themselves, through university-industry collaborations, licensing and
contracts, corporate venture capital investments, or outright acquisitions (e.g., Arora et al.,
2001; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005).3 Thus, large rms may be withdrawing from internal
research to concentrate on development, while absorbing external research from universities
and start-ups.
Figure 3. Corporate patents and internal research
3Arora et al. (2016) nd that a third of all externally sourced inventions are sourced through licensing,
contracts, and outright acquisitions.
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The institutional developments of the early 1980s arguably created an ecosystem where
research from universities and university-spawned start-ups is more abundant and packaged
in a way that it is easier for large rms to absorb. A variety of data reects this claim (see
Figure 4). American universities started ling for patents at an increasing rate, from about
5,000 patents in 1995 to more than 20,000 in 2015. Licensing income increased from less
than $600 million in 1995 to almost $2 billion in 2015. The number of start-ups formed
using university inventions more than quadrupled during the same period, from less than 200
in 1995 to more than 900 in 2015. Universities produced nearly 75% of the total scholarly
output in 2013, up from 69% in 1999.
Stanford University provides an extreme example of the impact of university education
and research on the economy. Based on a large-scale survey of Stanford alumni and sta¤,
Eesley and Miller (2018) estimate that nearly 40,000 companies can trace their roots to
Stanford. These companies created an estimated 5.4 million jobs and generate annual world
revenues of $2.7 trillion. Eesley and Miller (2018: 130) calculate that, [i]f these companies
collectively formed an independent nation, its estimated economy would be the worlds 10th
largest.
Figure 4: University patent applications, licensing and start-ups
Among corporations, the contribution of large rms to research and innovation declined,
and the contribution of small rms rose. NSF data indicate that rms with more than 10,000
employees accounted for 73 percent of non-federally funded R&D in 1985. By 1998, this share
had dropped to 54 percent, and to 51 percent by 2008 (Mowery, 2009). A di¤erent indicator
of the decline in the relative importance of large rms is the sharp drop in share of large
rms in the R&D 100 awards winners: whereas 41 percent of the awards went to Fortune 500
rms in 1971, only 6 percent went to Fortune 500 rms in 2006 (Block and Keller, 2009).
An important class of small rms are venture-backed start-ups. VC partnerships nance a
very small minority of all new rms about 1/6 of 1% on average per year in the US (Kaplan
and Lerner, 2010; Lerner, 2012). Yet, VC-backed rms feature disproportionately among
the fastest growing and the best performing companies. In the US from 1999 to 2009, over
60% of IPOs originating from industrial start-ups received VC funding. VC-backed rms are
also distinctive innovators. Kortum and Lerner (2000) estimate that, on average, a dollar
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of venture capital results in three to four times more patents than a dollar of traditional
corporate R&D suggesting superior e¢ ciency in invention, but also perhaps a greater focus
on product, rather than process, invention by VC-backed startups.
Figure 5 examines whether VC-backed start-ups are making up for some of the decit in
publications created by large corporations. Our evidence suggests that the answer is in the
negative. Rather than being independent sources of new science, venture-backed start-ups
appear to focus on patenting and commercializing discoveries made elsewhere. Thus, their
most important role may be as translators of university research, or as external paths to
innovation of discoveries made within larger corporations (i.e., spin-o¤s).
Figure 5: Publishing and patenting by US venture capital backed start-ups
Overall, the evidence for the period 1980-2006 is consistent with a division of labor in
which universities specialize in research, small start-ups convert promising new ndings into
inventions and larger, more established, rms specialize in product development and com-
mercialization. In this view, smaller rms have a comparative advantage in experimenting
and generating inventions, whereas larger rms have an advantage in exploiting them. Large
rms may invest in scientic capability to be e¤ective buyers of knowledge.
3 A model of the US innovation ecosystem
In this section, we develop a simple model of the US innovation ecosystem. We then use the
model to examine how the incentives to invest in internal research may have changed over
time and the welfare implications of these trends. In our model, inventions can be produced
by large rms in their labs and by start-ups. Large rms commercialize the inventions
that they generate internally; however, if they fail to innovate, they can collaborate with
start-ups and commercialize their inventions. Thus, markets for technology reduce the large
rmsincentives to invest in internal research by giving them an outside option external
(start-up) inventions. Universities perform a dual role in our model: (i) they train scientists
that large rms can hire (thus reducing the cost of internal research) and (ii) they employ
researchers who may start their own businesses (thus increasing the number and quality of
external inventions).
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We explore the possibility that the rise and fall of corporate internal research documented
in the previous section may be related to the growth of American universities. Specically,
we argue that the growing availability of qualied scientists may have initially encouraged
large corporations to create their own labs to compensate for a paucity of external sources of
invention. However, as universities grew larger and larger, corporations started to increasingly
rely upon universities and university start-ups to produce more of the inventions they needed.4
3.1 Set-up
The model has two periods. In the rst period, a large rm invests in internal research. Let p
be the probability that the investment generates a useful invention. The value of this internal
invention is VI . The cost of internal research associated with a probability of invention p, is
1
2





With probability 1   p, however, internal research fails to produce an invention. In the
second period the rm will then search for an external invention. Thus we assume that
commercializing an internal invention and commercializing an external invention are mutually
exclusive. That is, the large rm cannot pursue both, perhaps due to limits to managerial
attention, or nancial constraints. Thus, from the point of view of the large rm, internal
and external inventions are substitutes.7
4Our model highlights the e¤ects of university research and education on corporate R&D. However, revers-
ing the usual conception of industry building on abstractscience, it must also be recognized that in many
instances scientic understanding followed practice (Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986: 247). Many sciences,
such as chemistry, electric engineering, and genetics have developed as an e¤ort to understand and improve
upon current industrial practices, and to solve practical problems. Corporate sponsorship of university re-
search is also important in many scientic elds. A more complete model of science and corporate R&D
would also incorporate linkages from corporate R&D to university science.
5Notice that we are not assuming that inventions necessarily arise from research, merely that a certain
amount of research is needed for successful invention. A serenditpitous invention may spur research for the
additional improvements required for commercial success.
6We could equivalently write this problem in terms of the number of scientists x employed in a corporate
lab. For instance, we could assume that p(x) =  2
p
x is the probability that a lab employing x scientists will
make a scientic discovery. Then 12c[p(x)]
2 = 12c
2x, where w  12c
2 is a scientists wage.
7That internal and external inventions are mutually exclusive is a simplication. We could construct a
model where large rms do internal research and also engage in some collaboration. What is important is
that there is some substitution at the margin between internal and external inventions. If instead the large
rm could commercialize an unlimited number of internal and external inventions simultaneously, the trade
o¤ between internal and external inventions emphasized in this model would not be present.
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There are two start-ups that can generate external inventions. We assume that (i) these
inventions compete for the same market of value VE (i.e., start-up inventions are substi-
tutes in the marketplace) and (ii) invention probabilities are independent across start-ups.
These assumptions imply that, while the two start-ups are trying to solve the same problem
(because of assumption (i)), they do so by adopting di¤erent technological or commercial
approaches (because of assumption (ii)). Thus, it is possible that one start-up succeeds at
developing an invention, while the other fails. For instance, consider the problem of minia-
turizing microchips in semiconductors. Historically, some rms tried to solve this problem
by miniaturizing components, while others tried to solve the problem by developing an inte-
grated circuit (Cohen and Malerba, 2001). Texas Instruments build the rst working example
of integrated circuit in 1958 using germanium; Fairchild Semiconductor followed 6 months
later with a new, more practical version using silicon. The integrated circuit made of silicon
eventually came to dominate the market, while the other approaches were largely abandoned.8
We also stress that, while start-ups try to solve the same problem, the large rm and the
start-ups focus on di¤erent problems. The market for the internal invention (worth VI) and
the market for start-up inventions (worth VE) are distinct. Thus, large rms and start-ups,
perhaps because they di¤er in resources or incentives, tend to specialize on di¤erent types of
problems and inventions.
As a consequence, there are two types of diversity in this model: diversity in types of in-
ventions and diversity in approaches to solve the same problem. Both are valuable. Diversity
in types of innovations allows for experimentation with di¤erent types of problems (both VI
and VE can be created). Diversity in approaches allows for experimentation with di¤erent
methods to solve a given problem (and therefore the probability that value VE is created
increases).
Let q 2 (0; 1) be the probability that a start-up produces an invention in a baseline sce-
nario where collaboration with the large rm is ignored. Because invention probabilities are
independent, both start-ups produce an invention with probability q2; in that case, we as-
sume that the market VE is shared equally between the start-ups. With probability 2q(1 q),
however, only one start-up invents and captures the whole market. Finally, with probability
8The model captures diversity in approaches by assuming that the probabilities of invention are not
perfectly correlated across start-ups (for simplicity, independent). In this model, however, there are only two
start-ups. For a given level of correlation, diversity in approaches can also be increased by increasing the
number of start-ups.
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(1  q)2, no invention is produced and value VE is not created.9
If internal research fails, the large rm can collaborate with one of the two start-ups
to produce an invention and commercialize it. This collaborating start-up may be a local
start-up with previous ties to the large rm. Collaboration brings two advantages to the
partnering rms, relative to the baseline scenario. First, the probability of invention increases
from q to q +  , where  2 [0; 1   q] measures the large rms co-development capabilities.
Second, if both start-ups produce an invention, the share of the market that is won by the
partnership becomes (1 + ) =2, where  2 [0; 1] is a proxy for the value of the large rms
complementary assets. Examples of such complementary assets could be brand recognition,
sophisticated advertising campaigns, and increased prominence in distribution channels.
The critical di¤erence between  and  is that, while an increase in the probability of
invention  creates social value, the parameter  represents a purely re-distributive shift.
Collaboration creates social value because of the added chance  (1  q) that a start-up
creates value VE. By contrast,  only measures how value VE is distributed between the
partnering rms and the non-collaborating start-up. In the following, we will sometimes
call the benets associated with  the value-creating advantageof collaboration, and the
benets associated with  the appropriability advantage.
Given these assumptions, the value that accrues to the large rm and the start-up if they
form a partnership is:
(q +  )






Let  be the share of this value goes to the large rm, and 1    the share that goes to
the start-up. Remember that the large rm only collaborates with the start-up if internal
research fails (which occurs with probability 1   p) Thus, assuming that the large rm and
the start-up agree to collaborate, the total payo¤ that accrues to the large rm is
(p) = pVI  
1
2
cp2 + (1  p)(q +  )






while the payo¤ that accrues to the collaborating start-up is
C = pq





VE + (1  p)(q +  )






9Section 3.2 formalizes the idea that start-up invention q is spurred by university research r. In addition,
start-ups must also typically perform some R&D to invent (otherwise, the probability of invention q would
presumably be 0). The current model abstracts from start-upsinvestments in R&D. However, these costs
could easily be incorporated in the model without qualitatively a¤ecting the results.
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Note that the large rm will agree to collaborate if   0, whereas the start-up will agree to
collaborate if
(q +  )





(1  )  q






Dene  as the value of  such that (4) holds with equality. Cleary  increases in  and , the
value-creating and appropriability advantages of collaboration. Collaboration is benecial to
both partners and hence possible only if  2 [0; ]. Within this range, we can think of  as
reecting the relative bargaining power of the large rm, vis-à-vis the start-up.
The large rm chooses the optimal level of internal research e¤ort p that maximizes its







1  (q +  )








Several factors a¤ect investment in internal invention: the value of internal innovation VI ,
the cost of internal research c, the probability of external invention q, the share of the value
of external invention captured by the large rm , the relative value of external invention k,
and  and , the value-creating and appropriability advantages of collaboration.
3.2 Growth of American universities and investments in internal
research
We can use this simple model to examine how the growth of American universities has
a¤ected the incentives to invest in internal research. Let r 2 [0; 1] be an index parametrizing
the sizeand qualityof American universities. Clearly r has grown substantially over the
last century and a half.
Universities perform a dual role in our model. First, they train scientists that large rms
can hire. This reduces the cost, c, of carrying out internal research. Formally, we assume c is
a (weakly) decreasing function of r. A reduction in c unambiguously raises internal research:
pm will increase as c falls.
Second, universities employ scientists who may generate inventions and start their own
businesses. Thus, the probability of start-up invention q is a (weakly) increasing function
of r. The e¤ect of an increase in external invention q on pm is not obvious. There are two
countervailing forces, which we label the matchingand the competitione¤ects. On the
one hand, when there are more start-ups, the large rm is more likely to nd a partner to
commercialize an external invention (the term (q+ ) in (5) increases). This implies that pm
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tends to decline, because technology markets provide a better alternative to internal research.
On the other hand, more start-ups also mean more competition for the large rm and its
partner (the term (1  q) + q(1 + )=2 in equation (5) decreases). This competition e¤ect
reduces the benets of collaboration and increases the incentives to invest in internal research
pm.
Our brief historical review showed that internal research was initially low, increased over
time along with an increase in the size and quality of universities, and then started to decline.
These trends were mirrored by an initial reliance upon external innovation, followed by a
focus on internal innovation, and subsequently followed by a renewed openness to external
innovation. In terms of the model, this suggests that as r grew larger over time, pm rst
increased and then declined.
We can rewrite (5) as





and g (r) =

1  (q(r) +  )








Appendix 1 provides conditions under which pm rst increases and then declines with r.
Intuitively, these conditions say that, when r is low, f(r) grows rapidly compared to the
decline in g(r) as r increases, but when r is very large, g(r) declines relatively rapidly. These
conditions are more likely to hold when c and q are su¢ cientlyconvex in r. This implies
that, when American universities were small (r low), growing investment in universities must
have greatly reduced the cost c of hiring scientists. However, later on, when American
universities were already training large numbers of researchers (r big), this e¤ect was much
smaller. Conversely, at rst start-up invention q must not have been greatly a¤ected by
growing investment in universities. However, later on, when American universities became
among the best in the world (r big), additional investment in universities began to spur
signicant start-up activity.
As a numerical example, suppose c(r) = 1  1
2
p
r, q(r) = 1
2
r, VI = 1 and k = 12 . Figures
6a-6d plot pm(r) for di¤erent values of  and .10 In all cases, pm(r) rst increases and then
declines with r.
10Note that the start-up will agree to collaborate only if condition (4) holds. Except when  =  = 0, we
can always choose  and k so that k = 12 and condition (4) holds.
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Figures 6a-6d
Because internal invention and collaboration are substitutes in our model, the same con-
ditions imply a U-shaped pattern in the importance of technology markets as r increases.
That is, the probability of collaboration 1  p rst decreases and then increases with r.
While our discussion emphasizes the role of American universities, this was of course not
the only factor that a¤ected investments in internal research. In discussing why around the
1920s in-house corporate labs supplanted the individual inventor, Lamoreaux and Sokolo¤
(1999) stress the emergence of large rms with signicant market power. In our model,
this can be captured by an increase in VI (keeping k constant). This would increase pm,
precisely as Lamoreaux and Sokolo¤ suggest. Similarly, Hounshell (1996) argues that an-
titrust pressures (at least until Reagans antitrust revolution in the 1980s) reduced large
rmsability to rely on M&A as a source of growth. This encouraged rms to seek alterna-
tive sources of growth, especially innovation. Initially, this meant internal invention. Over
time, however, the growth in the the number of producers seeking innovations encouraged
the entry of specialized technology suppliers by broadening the pool of potential buyers of
technology (Bresnahan and Gambardella, 1998). Thus, especially after the 1980s, we would
expect internal research to decline because technology markets provide an increasingly better
alternative to the big corporate lab.
3.3 Diversity and social welfare
Next, we compare the outcome of our market economy with the outcome that would be
selected by a planner trying to maximize social welfare. Throughout, we will assume that
the rmsprivate value of the invention is also the social value; that is, we ignore information
spillovers and consumer surplus. This extreme assumption eliminates a typical source of
market ine¢ ciency, namely underinvestment in R&D due to imperfect appropriability of the
returns from innovation. Nevertheless, as we will see, ine¢ ciencies remain.
In our model, large rms can either under-invest or over-invest in internal research, de-
pending on parameter values. Thus, our underinvestment problem would be exacerbated if
there was also the traditional imperfect appropriability problem, whereas our overinvestment
problem would be mitigated.
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+ (1  p) (1  q): (6)
The rst term is the baseline probability that, without the support of the large rm, at least
one start-up will produce an invention. The second term captures the contribution of the
large rm to external invention. Pext decreases with p because, if internal research succeeds,
the large rm will not collaborate. Hence the co-development benets of collaboration  will
not accrue.
Social welfare SW is the sum of the surplus from internal invention, pVI   12cp
2, and the
surplus arising from external invention, Pext(p)VE:
SW (p) = pVI  
1
2









Note that society only cares that one start-up invention is brought to market if both start-
ups succeed, the social value of the second innovation is zero. This is because start-ups
experiment with di¤erent ways of solving the same problem.




[1   (1  q)k] (8)
where k = VE
VI
is the relative importance of the external invention.
Inspection of (7) reveals that, in choosing ps, the social planner trades o¤ the benets
from two types of diversity: diversity in types of inventions and diversity in approaches. By
increasing p, the social planner increases the chance that a type of invention di¤erent from
start-up invention the large labs invention is produced. Both VI and VE can be created.
However, a larger p reduces the probability of collaboration. Collaboration, however, only
adds social value when the other non-collaborating start-up fails (which occurs with prob-
ability 1   q). Indeed, insofar start-ups only di¤er in the approaches for solving the same
problem, their e¤orts are substitutes from societys viewpoint. Collaboration is socially valu-
able because it encourages multiple, not perfectly correlated (and hence diverse) approaches
to start-up invention.
From societys viewpoint, therefore, investment in internal research is benecial because
it promotes diversity in the types of problems that rms try to solve; collaboration instead
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facilitates multiple start-up inventions and hence promotes diversity in the approaches used




be the probability that at least one external invention is produced when p is chosen optimally
by the large rm. Similarly, let
P sext = Pext(p
s)
be the probability that at least one external invention is produced when p is chosen to




and P sext > P
m
ext if p
s < pm. Underinvestment in internal research and excessive tendency to
engage in open innovation are closely intertwined. Indeed, if the external research sector did
not exist, the private and social value of internal research would coincide and would both be
given by (1). Thus, underinvestment in internal research is caused by an excessive incentive
(from societys standpoint) to engage in open innovation, and conversely for overinvestment
in internal research.
Proposition 1 compares the market outcome (pm; Pmext) to the socially e¢ cient outcome
(ps; P sext) and provides a simple condition characterizing the types of ine¢ ciencies that can
occur.
Proposition 1 (Diversity). Let  2 [0; ]. The large rms under-invests in internal













q +  
: (9)
If this inequality is reversed, the large rms over-invests in internal research (ps < pm) and
engages too little in open innovation (P sext > P
m
ext).
Proof. ps > pm implies (q +  )





 >  (1   q). After some manipulations,
this yields condition (9). 
Proposition 1 shows that underinvestment in internal research and socially excessive open
innovation are more likely to occur when q,  and  are large and  is small. Conversely,
overinvestment in internal research and too little open innovation are more likely when q, 
and  are small and  is large.
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Two e¤ects drive these results. The rst is rent sharing. Because the large rm and
the start-up share the rents from successful innovation, the large rm tends to have socially
insu¢ cient incentives to collaborate. The larger  (the share of the rents that goes to the
large rm), the greater the large rms incentives to engage in open innovation, and hence
the lower its incentives to invest in internal research.
The second e¤ect relates to competition and appropriability. Even when the other start-up
innovates, the large rm still reaps some prot from an open innovation strategy because the
start-up market VE is shared among the competing inventions. This component of the large
rms prot is not included in the social welfare because society does not care about who wins
the market VE; society only cares that at least one invention is brought to market (Dasgupta
and Maskin, 1987). The better the partnership is at winning market share at the expense
of the independent start-up (as captured by the parameter ), the greater the incentives of
the large rm to engage in open innovation. If  is large enough, this competitive, me too
incentive can more than compensate for the opposite, rent sharing e¤ect. The large rm will
tend to excessively engage in open innovation, and will underinvest in internal research.
It is important to emphasize that, while open innovation may generate too many me too
inventions, this strategy is in general not without social value. Start-ups, even if they are
trying to solve similar problems, attempt di¤erent approaches to invention. This diversity in
approaches benets society. In choosing the socially optimum level of internal research ps, the
planner e¤ectively trades o¤ the benets from heterogeneity in types of inventions (internal
vs. start-up innovation) with the benets from heterogeneity in approaches (ensuring that at
least one start-up innovation is created). Indeed, in our model the market can exhibit either
too much or too little open innovation, depending on parameter values.11
The model emphasizes how the growth of American universities may have a¤ected the
evolution of the American innovation ecosystem. We assumed that, as universities r grow,
large labssta¢ ng costs c decline and the probability of start-up invention q increases. In-
spection of (9) immediately yields the following result.
Corollary. As r grows, it becomes more likely that the large rm will under-invest in internal
research (ps > pm) and will excessively engage in open innovation (P sext < P
m
ext).
11Open innovation is also socially benecial because the large rm has co-development capabilities  . The
greater  , the greater the social benets from open innovation. Because these benets are not fully captured
by the large rm (due to rent sharing), the large rm is more likely to over-invest in internal research and
engage too little in open innovation when  is large.
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Intuitively, underinvestment in internal research is more likely when start-up innovation
is abundant (q(r) large), because then the risk of me tooinventions is more serious. Large
rms would generate more social welfare if they devoted some of their resources to internal
research, instead of trying to acquire inventions in the market.
Equation (9) characterizes the sign (or direction) of the ine¢ ciency whether we have
underinvestment or overinvestment in internal research. We can also examine how changes
in r a¤ect the size of the ine¢ ciency. The size of the ine¢ ciency is given by












q +  

: (10)
There is an interesting asymmetry in how r a¤ects ps pm. When r is large, underinvestment
in internal research (ps > pm) is more likely because a bigger q tends to make the term in
square brackets positive. In addition, a large r also lowers c, the cost of sta¢ ng a lab. This
magnies the size of the ine¢ ciency, because the term VE=c in (10) becomes bigger. By
contrast, when r is small, the term in square brackets is negative and overinvestment in
internal research occurs. Nevertheless, the size of the ine¢ ciency ps   pm may remain small
(in absolute value) because, when r is small, c tends to be large. This asymmetry suggests
that the problem of underinvestment in internal research that occurs when universities r spur
a lot of start-up activity may be more severe than the problem of overinvestment in internal
research that occurs when universities are small.12
4 The benets of diversity
Recent evidence indicates that, in the last few decades, large corporations have withdrawn
from internal research. From this fact alone, one cannot conclude that American innovation
is at risk. An ecosystem where research is mostly performed by universities and start-ups
may be nimbler and more e¢ cient than one where large corporations and their labs play a
more important role.
Nevertheless, the opposite view that changes in an innovation ecosystem are always ben-
ecial is also simplistic. As the model above shows, the incentives of large rms to engage
in collaboration and open innovation can be excessive from societys standpoint. This prob-
lem is most likely to be severe when universities create a vibrant start-up ecosystem where
12This intuition is reinforced by other considerations. For instance, when consumer surplus is added to the
analysis, underinvestment in internal research also becomes a more serious problem.
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start-up innovation is plentiful. In that case, the open innovation strategy of large rms can
result in me tooinnovations that the market would have generated anyway. Society would
benet if large rms invested more of their resources in internal research.
The welfare analysis in the model is predicated on the assumption that large rms in their
labs produce inventions that are qualitatively di¤erent from those produced by universities
and smaller rms. In that case, the demise of the large corporate lab can reduce social
welfare by reducing diversity in the types of inventions produced. There are several reasons
why large rms may focus on inventions that are di¤erent from those created by other types
of organizations.
First, large rmsresearch may di¤er from small rmsresearch because large rms have
access to greater nancial resources and can tackle multidisciplinary problems by integrating
multiple knowledge streams and capabilities (Tether, 1998; Pisano, 2010). In the semicon-
ductor industry, for instance, Kapoor (2013) nds that integrated incumbents adapted to
increasing vertical disintegration by reconguring their activities more towards systemic in-
novations (which require extensive coordination and communication across di¤erent stages
of production and actors) and less towards autonomous innovations (which require relatively
little adjustment). Similarly, Lecuona (2017) nds that large rms were more likely to lever-
age general purpose technologies to introduce architectural innovations in mobile telephony
handsets.
Large rms may also benet from closer coordination between R&D and manufacturing.
According to Holbrook et al. (2000: 1030), cross-functional coordination not only con-
tributed to [semiconductor rm] Fairchilds great early commercial success, but it also led
to Fairchilds two major breakthroughs: the planar process and integrated circuits. Fabless
rms specializing on the design of innovative integrated circuits, while avoiding the high costs
of building and operating manufacturing facilities, may nd it hard to come up with this type
of innovations.
An advantage of large corporate labs is that they can organize their research by problem,
rather than by discipline, the approach generally taken by universities. Germanys slow
entry to the biotechnology sector, for example, has been partly attributed to the rigidity
of German university departments (Rosenberg, 1991). Furthermore, commercialization of
university research may be subject to frictions, such as geographical isolation from the
relevant industry actors (Belenzon and Schankerman, 2013; Bikard and Marx, 2015). This
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may hinder or delay technology transfer from universities to industry. Consistent with this,
as Bikard (2015) nds, and Arora et al. (2017) conrm, industry research is more readily
used by industry inventors than university research.
While our model emphasizes that the demise of the large corporate lab can be detrimental
to society because large and small rms focus on di¤erent types of innovations, in reality the
demise of the large corporate lab can be a problem for society also because their research
activities produce signicant external benets. Xerox has been widely criticized for failing to
appropriate the returns of innovations such as the rst personal computer with a graphical
user interface. Yet, these innovations paved the way for the rise of other American technology
giants, such as Apple and Microsoft.
The Xerox case also points to an additional class of external benets that may arise from
the activities of large labs: spin-o¤ activity. Agrawal et al. (2014) nd a large innovation
premium in regions where numerous small labs coexist with at least one large lab, compared
to regions of a similar size without many small labs or a large lab. One important reason
appears to be the spin-o¤ activity of large labs, which suggests the presence of signicant
positive externalities generated by the research activities of large rms. Thus, the best
innovation ecosystems may be those where large and small rms coexist.
Steven Klepper (2016) has systematically documented the importance of spin-o¤s in the
US innovation ecosystem. He found that in many high-tech industries, including the early
automobile industry, semiconductors and lasers, the leading rms spawned more and better
spin-o¤s. For instance, between 1895 and 1966, spin-o¤s accounted for 20% of all the entrants
in the automobile industry (145 of 725), but 67% (14 of 21) of the later industry leaders.
In semiconductors, spin-o¤s by a single early leader, Fairchild Semiconductor, arguably led
to the creation of one of the industrial wonders of the modern world Silicon Valley. The
comparison between Fairchild and Texas Instruments is revealing. Texas Instruments was
much better managed than Fairchild but also spawned far fewer spin-o¤s. This suggests the
paradoxical conclusion that incompetence in managing a leading rm may be, for society at
least, a blessing in disguise. It is likely, in fact, that the spin-o¤s resulting from the misman-
agement of people and research at Fairchild encouraged diversity and innovation far more
than the e¤orts of a well-run Fairchild could have. Consistent with this view, Chesbrough
(2002, 2003) nds that stronger links between Xerox and the spin-o¤s it generated tended
to inhibit spin-o¤ performance. The key problem was not Xeroxs initial equity position
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in the spin-o¤s per se, but Xeroxs practices in managing the spin-o¤s, which discouraged
experimentation by forcing them to look for applications close to Xeroxs existing businesses.
5 Conclusion
As documented here and in related work, large US rms are investing less in scientic research
and focusing more on development. Small rms also do not appear to make up for a signicant
portion of the research shortfall. This evidence is consistent with a division of innovative
labor where universities specialize in research, small start-ups convert promising new ndings
into inventions and larger, more established rms specialize in product development and
commercialization.
While this increasingly compartmentalized division of innovative labor may be e¢ cient,
in this paper we strike a more cautionary note. Using a simple model, we show that, even in
the absence of appropriability problems, prot-maximizing rms may under-invest in internal
research. In our model, large and small rms focus on solving di¤erent problems. Large rms,
for instance, may have an advantage at producing innovations that are more complex or costly
than those produced by smaller rms or universities. Large rms can use their assets either to
commercialize their internal inventions, or to commercialize external inventions acquired from
small rms. We show that, although there are benets in duplicating small rmsresearch
e¤orts (as any one small rm can fail), sometimes large rms have an excessive incentive
to engage in an open innovationstrategy. The reason is that large rms may win market
share, even when these markets are already populated by other rms trying to commercialize
similar inventions. Society, on the other hand, would benet from greater investment in
internal research, as this would result in greater diversity of innovations. Thus, the risk we
highlight is that open innovation may tend to crowd out more costly or architectural types
of research done in large corporate labs.
In addition, of course, large rmsresearch e¤orts may be plagued by appropriability prob-
lems. Research is an activity that is well-known to produce important spillovers. Increasing
competition, by exacerbating appropriability problems, may reduce the private incentives to
invest in internal research, even if its value to society is large.
Rosenberg suggested that diversity in organizational forms is conducive to technological
and economic growth. He argued that capitalist economies encourage experimentation by
large and small rms, whereas planned, centralized economies put excessive faith on the
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importance of large size (Rosenberg, 1992). In recent times, one key component of the US
innovation ecosystem the large corporate lab has diminished in importance. This decrease
in diversity may be a reason for concern.
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We want to provide conditions under which pm rst increases then decreases in r. Note
d2pm
dr2
= f 00g + fg00 + 2f 0g0 (11)
where primes denote derivatives with respect to r. Because c is (weakly) decreasing in r,
f 0  0. The sign of g0 is a priori ambiguous. However, if
2   (1  )
then g0  0 over the relevant range q 2 (0; 1]. To see this, note that g(r) is convex in q and




1  . Note also that 2   (1   ) implies that q
min  1
and thus that g(r) decreases in q (and hence in r) over the relevant range. For instance, if 
is close to 1, then condition 2   (1  ) holds and g(r) ' 1  t(q +  )k is decreasing in
q (and r).
Because 2   (1   ) implies that f 0g0  0, (11) is negative if f and g are not too

















is negative if c is su¢ ciently convex. Similarly, let h = (q +  )
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is also negative if q is su¢ ciently convex. For instance, if  ' 1, then d2h
dq2
' 0 and any
convex function q would do.
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Thus, to summarize, if 2   (1   ) and c and q are su¢ ciently convex, then (11)
is negative. Investment in internal research pm rst increases and then declines with r. Of
course to ensure that pm achieves a maximum within the relevant range [r; r], we also need











Appendix 2: Additional results
Proposition 1 in the main body of the paper shows that underinvestment in internal
research is more likely when the benets of collaboration arise from the appropriability ad-
vantage , rather than the value-creating advantage  . Here we show that in the extreme
case of pure value-creating advantage of collaboration ( = 0), underinvestment in internal
research always occurs. By contrast, in the extreme case of pure appropriability advantage
of collaboration ( = 0), both underinvestment and overinvestment in internal research can
occur.
Proposition 2.
(i). In the pure value-creating case (  = 0), there is can be under- or overinvestment
in internal research. If the start-up appropriates most of the value of the collaboration
( ' 0), then there is overinvestment in internal research. If the large rm appropriates
most of the value of the collaboration ( '  =  
q+ 
), then there is underinvestment in
internal research.
(ii). In the pure appropriability case ( = 0), there is underinvestment in internal research,
unless the start-up appropriates all the value of the collaboration ( = 0).
Proof of Proposition 2. (i). Suppose  = 0. From Proposition 1, there is underinvestment
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 ' 0, then clearly the inequality fails and there is overinvestment. If  '  
q+ 
, then the
inequality holds and there is underinvestment in internal research.









holds and there is overinvestment in
internal research unless  = 0. 
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